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Previous research on shame and guilt has tended to focus on their unique associations 
with other variables.  It has become commonplace to eliminate the substantial shared variance 
with shame when examining guilt, and to eliminate shared variance with guilt when examining 
shame. What previous research has typically not done is to examine the variance shared by 
shame and guilt.  In a series of three studies, we addressed this issue by employing bi-factor 
models to examine the general factor shared by shame and guilt, and its relationship to several 
important personality traits and two broad liability factors of psychopathology (i.e., externalizing 
and internalizing psychopathology). As hypothesized, the general factor shared by shame and 
guilt was strongly and positively associated with personality traits associated with moral 
emotions (empathy, agreeableness and conscientiousness), and strongly but inversely associated 
with both self-reported and informant-reported externalizing psychopathology. The general 
factor was also associated with self-consciousness, but not with self-criticism, vulnerable 
narcissism or neuroticism. The implications of these findings are discussed regarding the 
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION OF SHAME AND GUILT 
Shame and guilt have attracted interest from social and personality psychologists, clinical 
psychologists, and developmental psychologists, because they have long been recognized as a 
central force in motivating and regulating people’s thoughts, feelings and behaviors (Fischer & 
Tangney, 1995). Indeed, shame-proneness and guilt-proneness, the predispositions to experience 
these two emotions, have been found to be associated with many important outcomes, such as 
interpersonal functioning (Tangney, 1995), subjective well-being (Tangney & Dearing, 2002),  
numerous forms of psychopathology (e.g., Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992; Kim, 
Thibodeau & Jorgensen, 2011), and job satisfaction and performance (e.g., Schaumberg & 
Flynn, 2017), to name a few. 
Although researchers have yet to achieve consensus defining shame and guilt, the most 
cited approach defines shame and guilt via a self-versus-behavior distinction (Lewis, 1971; 
Tangney, 1996; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tracy & Robins, 2004). According to this approach, 
shame is considered an unpleasant emotion that arises from the awareness of flaws in one’s self. 
Guilt, by contrast, arises from the awareness of flaws in one’s behavior. Subtle as it might seem, 
the differential emphasis on self (“I did that horrible thing”) versus behavior (“I did that horrible 
thing”) is believed to set the stage for distinct patterns of motivations and subsequent behavior 
(Tangney et al., 2007). Specifically, for shame, the awareness of a flawed self leads to the desire 
to hide, withdraw and to avoid dealing with the consequences of their transgressions; for guilt, 
the focus on behavior is believed to motivate a more adaptive response to right their wrongs and 
make amends (Lewis, 1971). 
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Overlap Between Shame and Guilt 
Shame and guilt have been found to be strongly positively correlated (Tangney et al., 
1992). Even with measures sensitive to the self vs. behavior conceptual distinction, such as the 
Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3 (TOSCA-3; Tangney, Dearing, Wagner, & Gramzow, 2000), 
substantial positive correlations (around .5) are typically found (e.g., Tangney et al., 1992). 
Therefore, to address the significant overlap between shame and guilt, when examining their 
potential correlates, researchers have typically computed partial correlations to factor out shame 
from guilt, and vice versa (e.g., Tangney et al., 1992). This practice of examining shame 
removing shared variance with guilt (referred to as guilt-free shame) and guilt removing shared 
variance with shame (referred to as shame-free guilt), is believed to generate “pure” estimates of 
the associations between shame, guilt, and assorted outcomes. This practice has become so 
common that a meta-analysis of the link between shame, guilt and depression reported effect 
sizes not only for zero-order correlations but also for partial correlations (Kim et al., 2011). 
We believe that over-reliance on the use of partial correlations has created confusion in 
the field, for two reasons. First, by doing so we have largely ignored what is shared by shame 
and guilt, which we hypothesize contains critically important information. Furthermore, different 
conclusions have been drawn regarding shame, guilt and their relationships with various 
outcomes, because some researchers draw conclusions based on analyses partialing out what is 
shared by shame and guilt (e.g., Tangney et al., 1992), whereas other researchers draw 
conclusions based on analyses that do not eliminate covariance between shame and guilt (e.g., 
Klasen et al., 2015; Haag, Zehnder, Landolt, 2015). As has been pointed out by some researchers 
(e.g., Cohen et al., 2011), this can be extremely problematic as the results of partial correlation 
analyses are significantly different from those obtained with bivariate analyses (Tignor & 
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Colvin, 2017). For example, a meta-analysis of 74 studies found the bivariate association of guilt 
and depressive symptoms was r = .28 (Kim et al., 2011), whereas the partial correlation when 
removing shared variance with shame was close to zero (r = -.03).   
The Meaning of the General Factor  
To our knowledge, no research has ever examined the common variance shared by shame 
and guilt (hereafter referred to as the general factor). The primary goal of the current research 
was to explore the meaning and correlates of the general factor. Clues to the meaning of the 
general factor may be gleaned from the conceptualizations of shame and guilt as primarily: (a) 
self-conscious emotions; and (b) moral emotions. These two perspectives led us to propose two 
hypotheses regarding the meaning of the general factor: the moral emotion hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 1) and the self-conscious emotion hypothesis (Hypothesis 2). 
The Moral Emotion Hypothesis (Hypothesis 1). Some researchers consider shame and 
guilt to be prototypes of moral emotions that serve important social functions and set the stage 
for prosocial behaviors (Haidt, 2003). If this is correct, the cognitive and motivational state of 
shame and guilt should be highly associated with an empathic response, given that empathy has 
long been considered to be a central aspect of morality (Maibom, 2014; Hypothesis 1a). 
Moreover, if the general factor represents the moral aspect of shame and guilt, one would expect 
it to be associated with the personality traits of agreeableness and conscientiousness (Hypothesis 
1b), as it has been argued that these two traits are particularly relevant for moral processes 
(Walker, 1999). For example, it was found that prosocial motivation was the affective foundation 
for agreeableness (Graziano, Habashi, Sheese, &Tobin, 2007), and guilt was the affective core of 
conscientiousness (Fayard, Roberts, Robins, & Watson, 2012).   
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We believe examining the moral emotion hypothesis can shed light on an important 
debate that has been of notable interest to researchers in the field, that is, whether shame is a 
moral emotion (Eisenberg, 2000; de Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2007; Tangney et al., 
2007). Theoretically, shame has long been considered to play an important role in morality 
(Eisenberg, 2000; Haidt, 2003). It is believed to arise from concerns about the effects of one’s 
behaviors on others (Tangney, 1992), to involve concern about others’ evaluations (Ferguson et 
al., 1991; Tangney, 1992), and to inhibit undesirable, antisocial behaviors (Haidt, 2003). 
However, the empirical literature has provided inconsistent evidence regarding shame as a moral 
emotion (Tangney et al., 2007). Shame was found to be positively associated with personal 
distress (i.e., aversive, self-focused reactions to others in need or distress), but negatively 
associated with empathic responsiveness (Tangney, 1991), and positively associated with 
aggression (Tangney et al., 1992) and antisocial behaviors (Dearing et al., 2005). However, 
again, these findings are often based on analyses that controlled for guilt, thereby removing the 
common variance between shame and guilt. Given the substantial correlations between shame 
and guilt, the distinction between guilt and shame is not quite as clear cut as these findings 
suggest, pointing to the need to explore their common variance. If, indeed, the general factor of 
shame and guilt is strongly associated with morality-related variables (e.g., empathy, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness), it would suggest that the moral process is an inherent aspect 
of shame.  
The Self-Conscious Emotion Hypothesis (Hypothesis 2). The conceptualization of 
shame and guilt as self-conscious emotions has underscored the importance of being self-aware 
and self-conscious. Lewis (1995) maintained that the critical feature of self-conscious emotions 
is the ability to reflect upon oneself. Indeed, he wrote, “To feel them (self-conscious emotions), 
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individuals must have a sense of self (as well as a set of standards)” (p. 68). Seen from this light, 
one would expect the general factor to be associated with self-consciousness (Hypothesis 2a). In 
addition, the propensity to be self-evaluative and self-critical has also been central to the 
theorizing of many researchers who view shame and guilt as self-conscious emotions. Indeed, 
Tracy and Robins (2004) proposed that both shame and guilt are elicited by a common set of 
cognitive processes, involving appraising an event as relevant to and incongruent with one’s 
identity goals. As noted above, Lewis (1995) also maintained that the evaluative nature of self-
conscious emotions requires internalization of rules and standards, and the evaluation of oneself 
regarding these rules and standards. Seen from this light, it is reasonable to expect that the 
general factor is associated with a predisposition to self-criticism (Hypothesis 2b), as well as 
vulnerable narcissism (a central feature of which is an inadequate view of the self; e.g., Miller et 
al., 2011). Given the negative valence of shame and guilt, it is reasonable to expect the general 
factor to be positively associated with neuroticism and inversely related to extraversion 
(Hypothesis 2c). Indeed, both shame and guilt have been found to be positively correlated with 
fear, hostility, anxiety and sadness (Watson & Clark, 1992).  
Shame, Guilt, the General Factor and Psychopathology   
Psychologists have long speculated about the links between shame and guilt and 
psychopathology (Lewis, 1971). Research based on partial correlation analyses has typically led 
researchers to conclude that proneness to shame is related to a wide variety of psychological 
problems, whereas guilt-proneness is unrelated to internalizing psychopathology and inversely 
related to aggression and antisocial behaviors (Tangney et al., 1992; Stuewig & McCloskey, 
2005). As pointed out above, we believe partial correlation analyses might not be appropriate, as 
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it removes the common variance shared by shame and guilt which might contain critically 
important information for understanding psychopathology.  
Another goal of the present research was to try to clarify the nature of the relations 
between shame, guilt and higher order factors of psychopathology. Recent advances in 
psychopathology research have highlighted the importance of, and recommended the utilization 
of, not only specific mental disorders, but also potential broad liability factors that can account 
for the comorbidity between commonly occurring mental disorders (Krueger & Markon, 2006; 
Vollebergh et al., 2001; Krueger, 1999). Research has generally suggested that a structure with 
two superordinate liabilities, externalizing and internalizing disorders, is suited to explain the 
comorbidity between common mental disorders (Krueger & Markon, 2006; Vollebergh et al., 
2001; Krueger, 1999). The internalizing factor represents a general liability toward negative-
affect-laden mood and anxiety disorders, and encompasses diagnoses such as major depressive 
disorder, generalized anxiety disorder and more specific anxiety disorders (e.g., social phobia, 
panic disorder). The externalizing factor represents a general liability toward disinhibitory 
disorders, such as substance use disorder and antisocial personality disorder.  
        To our knowledge, the current research is the first to examine the association between 
shame, guilt and higher order liability factors. Our predictions are closely tied to our hypotheses 
regarding the meaning of the general factor. If the general factor turns out to capture the variance 
representing the moral aspect of shame and guilt (Hypothesis 1), we would then expect the 
general factor to be negatively associated with externalizing psychopathology (Hypothesis 1c), 
given that empathy and the tendency to behave prosocially have long been considered strong 
protective factors for externalizing psychopathology (Miller & Eisenberg, 1988). By contrast, if 
the general factor turns out to represent the negative self-evaluative process underlying shame 
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and guilt (Hypothesis 2), we would expect the general factor to be positively associated with 
internalizing psychopathology (Hypothesis 2d), given the long-established link between self-
criticism and internalizing psychopathology (Klein, Kotov, & Bufferd, 2011). 
Modeling the General Factor Using Bi-Factor Models 
Until now, if one wished to infer the relation between an outcome and that which is 
shared by shame and guilt, one could either: (a) examine the relations between the outcome and 
the sum of shame and guilt; or (b) examine the relations between the outcome and both shame 
and guilt.  If the outcome were associated with the sum of shame and guilt, or if the outcome 
were associated with both shame and guilt, one might presume the outcome was associated with 
that which is shared by shame and guilt.  Unfortunately, such conclusions may well be mistaken.  
For example, guilt and shame may both be associated with an outcome not because of what they 
share but because of separate unique sources of variance, both of which happen to be associated 
with the outcome. We propose that employing bi-factor models is a potentially useful approach 
to examine the general factor shared by shame and guilt. A bi-factor model allows simultaneous 
testing of the association of an outcome with the general factor and the unique contributions of 
specific factors underlying the general factor. Bi-factor models have been argued to have 
advantages over an individual score approach or second-order models (Chen, West & Sousa, 
2006; Chen, Hayes, Carver, Laurenceau, & Zhang, 2012). In fact, they have increasingly been 
used in recent research to study individual differences, the structure of psychopathology, as well 
as the association between personality traits and other important outcomes (e.g., McAbee, 
Oswald, & Connelly, 2014; Mu et al., 2016; Hur et al., 2016).   
We believe examining the general factor shared by shame and guilt using a bi-factor 
model is particularly advantageous. While partial correlation analyses often strip shame and guilt 
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of their common variance, the bi-factor model allows us to specify the general factor of shame 
and guilt, and examine its relationship to personality and psychopathology. Moreover, while it is 
common for researchers to use partial correlations, hierarchical regression or other multivariate 
models similar to the bi-factor structure when trying to establish the incremental validity of a 
construct, what is seldom confronted is that the multivariate meaning of that construct is often 
different than the univariate meaning. By contrast, the bi-factor model does a nice job of 
exposing the issue by pinpointing the source of the incremental validity and making it 
conceptually clearer. By imposing a bi-factor model, it is possible to partition the variance into: 
(a) the shared variance between shame and guilt; (b) the remaining variance specific to shame; 
and (c) the remaining variance specific to guilt.  
Research Overview  
We explicitly constructed and compared two bi-factor models in Study 1 to find the best 
way to specify explicitly the general factor shared by shame and guilt. We did so using two of 
the most frequently used instruments to measure the dispositions to experience shame and guilt, 
the Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3 (TOSCA-3; Tangney, Dearing, Wagner, & Gramzow, 2000) 
and the Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale (GASP; Cohen et al., 2011). In Study 2, we tested the 
moral emotion hypothesis that the general factor would be positively associated with empathy 
(Hypothesis 1a), agreeableness and conscientiousness (Hypothesis 1b), and negatively associated 
with externalizing psychopathology (Hypothesis 1c); we also tested the self-conscious emotion 
hypothesis that the general factor would be positively associated with neuroticism and negatively 
associated with extraversion (Hypothesis 2c), and positively associated with internalizing 
psychopathology (Hypothesis 2d). In Study 3, we further tested the self-conscious emotion 
hypothesis that the general factor would be positively associated with self-consciousness 
9 
 
(Hypothesis 2a), self-criticism and vulnerable narcissism (Hypothesis 2b). In Study 3, we also 
attempted to see whether the findings regarding psychopathology obtained in Study 2 would be 




CHAPTER 2: STUDY 1 AND TESTING OF THE BI-FACTOR MODELS 
In Study 1, we constructed and compared two bi-factor models to specify explicitly the 
shared variance among shame and guilt; we did so using two large datasets, one for the GASP 
and one for the TOSCA-3.  
Method 
Data for the GASP. The data sources for the current study were from several journal 
articles as well as unpublished data using the Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale (Cohen et al., 
2011). The overall sample included a total of 4316 participants (58.9% female). The majority of 
our sample identified themselves as White or Caucasian (74.2%); the rest identified as Black or 
African American (7.9%), Hispanic or Latino (4.2%), Asian American (7.4%), and multi-racial 
(6.2 %). The samples ranged from 19.1 to 39.3 years in age and averaged 34.7 (SD = 13.1).  
Data for the TOSCA-3. The data sources for the current study were from several journal 
articles as well as unpublished data using the Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3 (TOSCA-3; 
Tangney, Dearing, Wagner, & Gramzow, 2000). The overall sample included a total of 1069 
participants (62.4% female). The ethnic background of the sample was: 25.5% White or 
Caucasian, 4.1% Black or African American, 7.1% Hispanic or Latino, 17.6% Asian American, 
35.8% multiracial, 5.6% other. The mean age of the sample was 20.1 years (SD = 5.4).  
Measures 
Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale. We used Cohen et al.’s 16-item Guilt and Shame 
Proneness Scale (GASP; Cohen et al., 2011) as our first measure of dispositional shame and 
guilt. The scale has been shown to have good reliability and validity (Cohen et al., 2011). The 
GASP consists of four subscales, two measuring aspects of shame (self-devaluation, withdraw), 
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and two measuring aspects of guilt (behavior-devaluation, repair), with four items for each 
subscale. Participants were instructed to imagine themselves in a variety of situations that people 
could encounter in day-to-day life and indicate the likelihood that they would react in the way 
described (1 = very unlikely, 7 = very likely). A sample behavior-devaluation guilt item is “after 
realizing you have received too much change at a store, you decide to keep it because the 
salesclerk doesn’t notice. What is the likelihood that you would feel uncomfortable about 
keeping the money?” A sample repair guilt item is “You reveal a friend’s secret, though your 
friend never finds out. What is the likelihood that your failure to keep the secret would lead you 
to exert extra effort to keep secrets in the future?” A sample self-devaluation shame item is “You 
successfully exaggerate your damages in a lawsuit. Months later, your lies are discovered and 
you are charged with perjury. What is the likelihood that you would think you are a despicable 
human being?” A sample withdrawal shame item is “After making a big mistake on an important 
project at work in which people were depending on you, your boss criticizes you in front of your 
coworkers. What is the likelihood that you would feign sickness and leave work?”  Internal 
consistencies were α = .74 for the shame subscale, α = .64 for the guilt subscale,  α = .69 for the 
self-devaluation subscale, α = .64 for the withdrawal subscale, α = .74 for the behavior-
devaluation subscale, α = .69 for the repair subscale. It should be noted that alpha coefficients 
have been found to be lower for scenario-based measures because each item contains both the 
variance for the psychological construct as well as the variance introduced by the scenarios 
(Tangney, 1996).   
Test of Self-Conscious Affect-3. To increase the reliability and replicability of the 
present study, we included a second measure of dispositional shame and guilt, the Test of Self-
Conscious Affect-3 (TOSCA-3; Tangney, Dearing, Wagner, & Gramzow, 2000), a measure that 
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has been found to have good reliability and construct validity. The TOSCA-3 presents 
participants with 16 brief scenarios. After each scenario, the participant is provided with a 
statement intended to reflect a shame response and a guilt response. For example, the scenario 
“You are driving down the road, and you hit a small animal” is followed by “You would think: 
I’m terrible” (shame response) and “You'd feel bad you hadn't been more alert driving down the 
road” (guilt response). Participants were asked to rate the degree to which they would experience 
the provided response on a scale from 1 to 5. Like the GASP, the TOSCA-3 also measures 
shame via negative self-evaluation and withdrawal, and measures guilt via negative behavior-
evaluation and repair. Therefore, although the TOSCA-3 was originally designed to have two 
subscales (i.e., shame and guilt), it can also be divided into four subscales corresponding to those 
of the GASP: negative self-evaluation (10 items), withdrawal (6 items), negative behavior-
evaluation (8 items), and repair (8 items). Internal consistencies for the TOSCA-3 were α = .79 
for the shame subscale and α = .72 for the guilt subscale, α = .75 for the self-devaluation 
subscale, α = .55 for the withdrawal subscale, α = .53 for the behavior-devaluation subscale, α 
= .63 for the repair subscale.   
Statistical Analyses 
We first constructed and compared two models to find the best-fitting model to specify 
the general factor of shame and guilt. Model 1 was a bi-factor model with one general factor and 
two specific factors corresponding to shame and guilt (Figure 1). All factors were set to be 
orthogonal to each other because the general factor is supposed to account for any covariance 
shared between the two. All items were set to load onto the latent general factor as they were all 
aspects of shame and guilt. Each item was also loaded onto the specific shame or guilt factor that 
it belongs to.  
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Model 2 was identical to Model 1, except that we specified four, instead of two, specific 
factors (Figure 2), corresponding to the appraisals and action tendencies of shame (i.e., self-
devaluation and withdrawal) and guilt (i.e., behavior-devaluation and repair) respectively. Like 
Model 1, the four specific factors were set to be uncorrelated and all items were set to load onto 
the latent general factor.  
In this study, we used Item Response Theory (IRT; Reise, Widaman, & Pugh, 1993) to 
examine the measurement structure of our focal constructs. Analyses were carried out in the R 
package mirt (Chalmers, 2012). When dealing with Liker-type data, IRT models do not impose 
strict assumptions (e.g. normal distribution, linear relationship between latent and observed 
variables; Wirth & Edwards, 2007), and therefore is preferred to fit Likert-type categorical data. 
Specifically, we adopted the Graded Response Model (GRM) designed for ordinal data 
(Samejima, 1969). Full information maximum likelihood estimation (FIML) was used to deal 
with missing data. M2 Chi-square (M22) was calculated to evaluate the fitness of IRT models 
due to its superior performance over Pearson Chi-square (Cai & Hansen, 2013; Maydeu-Olivares 
& Joe, 2006). M22-based Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) and 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) were also reported. We adopted the recommended cut-off 
point .089 for RMSEA (Maydeu-Olivares & Joe, 2014) and .95 for CFI (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics. The means and standard deviations of the measures included in 
the analyses of Study 1 are displayed in Table 1 in the supplementary materials1.  
                                                          
1 In fact, the descriptive statistics for all three studies were presented in the supplementary materials.  
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GASP. We first constructed and compared Model 1 and Model 2 using the GASP. Fit 
indices of the models are presented in Table 1. Both models showed an excellent fit to the data. 
For Model 1, M22 =19.69, df = 8, RMSEA = .02, CFI = 1.00; for Model 2, M22 =26.14, df = 8, 
RMSEA = .02, CFI = .98.  
The factor loadings of both models can be found in Table 2. For both models, the items 
of three subscales (i.e., self-devaluation, behavior-devaluation, repair) loaded reasonably well 
onto both the general factor and the specific factors. It should be noted that the items in the 
withdrawal subscale did not load well onto the general factor (loadings ranging from -.01 to -.25 
for Model 1; from -.19 to .06 for Model 2). Withdrawal items loaded strongly onto the specific 
shame factor for Model 1 (loadings ranging from .55 to .73); and loaded strongly onto the 
specific withdrawal factor for Model 2 (loadings ranging from .56 to .72).  
TOSCA-3. We constructed and compared Model 1 and Model 2 using the TOSCA-3 as 
well. Fit indices of the models are presented in Table 1 as well. Model 1 and Model 2 revealed a 
similar fit to the data. For Model 1, M22 =1129.21, df = 334, RMSEA= .05, CFI = .82; for 
Model 2, M22 =1247.35, df = 334, RMSEA = .06, CFI = .79. It should be noted that the fit 
indices suggest that the model fit was mediocre for CFI but good for RMSEA. Although very 
few studies have ever examined the factor structure of the TOSCA-3, that the theoretically 
driven structure of the TOSCA-3 does not show an ideal fit to the data is consistent with past 
research (Stromsten et al., 2009). Moreover, we focused on the comparative fit of different 
models for the TOSCA-3 data, rather than maximizing absolute fit of each model.  
The factor loadings of both models can be found in Table 2. As with the GASP, for both 
models, the items of three subscales (i.e., self-devaluation, behavior-devaluation, repair) loaded 
reasonably well onto both the general factor and the specific factors. Again, loadings of the 
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withdrawal items onto the general factor varied significantly across items (loadings ranging from 
-.58 to -.29 and averaging .03 for Model 1, ranging from -.39 to .40 and averaging .13 for Model 
2). Withdrawal items loaded strongly onto the specific shame factor for Model 1 (loadings 
ranging from .31 to .61); and loaded strongly onto the specific withdrawal factor for Model 2 
(loadings ranging from .27 to .63).  
Discussion 
To summarize, we constructed and compared two models using two very large datasets 
for the two most commonly used measures of the dispositions to experience shame and guilt, the 
GASP and the TOSCA-3. Overall, Model 1 and Model 2 fit the data equally well, but Model 1 is 
structurally more parsimonious compared to Model 2, as Model 1 has only two specific factors 
of shame and guilt, whereas Model 2 further divides shame and guilt each into two specific 
subfactors. We believe it is noteworthy that even though the creators of the TOSCA-3 and the 
GASP have very different perspectives regarding how shame and guilt should be conceptualized 
and measured, rather similar structures emerged for both instruments when examined using 
Model 1; specifically, for both instruments, items measuring self-devaluation, behavior-
devaluation, and repair tended to load reasonably well onto the general factor, items measuring 
self-devaluation and withdrawal tended to load reasonably well onto the specific shame factor, 
and items measuring behavior-devaluation and repair tended to load reasonably well onto the 
specific guilt factor.  Given our primary interest in the general factor shared by shame and guilt, 




CHAPTER 3: STUDY 2 AND EXAMINING THE MORAL EMOTION HYPOTHESIS 
Study 2 had two broad goals. First, we focused on the general factor of shame and guilt 
by testing Hypothesis1 and Hypothesis 2. We tested Hypothesis 1 by examining the relationship 
between the general factor and: (a) personality traits that are linked to the propensity to 
experience moral emotions, namely empathy (Hypothesis 1a), agreeableness and 
conscientiousness (Hypothesis 1b); and (b) externalizing psychopathology (Hypothesis 1c). We 
tested Hypothesis 2 by examining the general factor and personality vulnerability factors that 
have been linked to the propensity to experience self-conscious emotions, namely: (a) 
neuroticism and extraversion (Hypothesis 2c); and (b) internalizing psychopathology 
(Hypothesis 2d). The second broad goal of Study 2 was to examine the relationships between the 
specific shame and guilt factors (when the general factor was taken into account) and the above 
mentioned outcomes.  
Participants 
Participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk, an online marketplace 
where “workers” can sign up for paid tasks, which has been shown to be a good source of 
inexpensive yet high-quality psychological data (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Only 
USA-based Mechanical Turk user accounts were eligible to respond to the advertisement. 
Surveys that were incomplete were excluded from analyses. To ensure data quality, two 
screening criteria were used: (a)the inclusion of seven attention checks to ensure that participants 
were paying attention to the questionnaires; and (b) limiting participation to prospective 
participants who had an IP address that did not match that of any other participant. A total of 28 
(5.9%) participants were excluded from the analyses because they failed on at least one of the 
attention check questions. This resulted in a total of 457 participants (M = 40.6 years of age, SD 
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= 14.1, 72.2% female). The ethnic background of our sample was 78.1% European American, 
10.7% African American, and 5.5% Asian/Asian American, 3.7% multiracial, 1.7% other.  
Measures 
Guilt and shame proneness. Like Study 1, guilt and shame proneness was measured 
using the GASP and the TOSCA-3.  
Empathy. Empathy was measured using the 7-item (α = .89) Empathic Concern Subscale 
from the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980), which has been shown to have good 
reliability and construct validity. The empathy subscale assesses “other-oriented” feelings of 
sympathy and concern for unfortunate others. Participants rated each item on a five-point scale 
(1 = does not describe me well; 5 = describes me very well). A sample item is “I would describe 
myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.”  
Big-five personality traits. The big-five personality traits were measured using the BFI-
44 self-report personality inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999). It has been shown to have good 
reliability and construct validity (John & Srivastava, 1999). Participants rated each item on a 
five-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). A sample item starts with “I see 
myself as someone who,” and was followed by a specific description. For example, a sample 
item is “is depressed, blue” for the neuroticism subscale, “is talkative” for the extraversion 
subscale, “can be somewhat careless” for the conscientious subscale, “has a forgiving nature” for 
the agreeableness subscale, and “is inventive” for the openness subscale. The internal 
consistencies were.84, .85, .82, .82 and .90 for the openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, 
agreeableness, and neuroticism scales, respectively.  
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Externalizing psychopathology. Externalizing psychopathology was measured using 57 
items from the Externalizing Spectrum Inventory – Brief Form (ESI-bf; Patrick, Kramer, 
Krueger & Markon, 2013). These items form the Item-based Factor Scales, developed as an 
efficient measurement of the ESI’s three higher-order factors (Patrick et al., 2013): the general 
disinhibition subfactor (ESIGDIS), 20 items, α = .87; the callous-aggression subfactor (ESIAGG), 18 
items, α = .88; the substance abuse subfactor (ESISUB), 17 items, α = .92. Items were rated on a 
four-point scale (T= True, t = somewhat true, f = somewhat false, F= False). Sample items are 
“I often act on immediate needs” (ESIGDIS), “I’ve injured people to see them in pain” (ESIAGG), 
and “I've spent big parts of my day using marijuana” (ESISUB).  
Depression. Depression was measured with 7 items (α = .92) from the Anhedonic 
Depression subscale from Mood and Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire (MASQ-AD; Watson & 
Clark, 1991; Watson et al., 1995). The MASQ-AD subscale assesses aspects unique to 
depression (i.e., anhedonia) rather than those shared with anxiety (e.g., high negative affect; 
Clark & Watson, 1991). The selection of items was informed by previous work in which the 8-
item version of Anhedonic Depression subscale was shown to better predict current depressive 
episodes than the full version (Bredemeier et al., 2010). Due to IRB-related issues, the suicidality 
item was not included. Items were rated using a 5-point scale (1= not at all; 5= extremely). A 
sample item is “Felt really slowed down.”  
Social Anxiety. Social anxiety was measured with the 8-item (α = .96) version of the 
Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (BFNE-S; Weeks et al., 2005). It has been shown to 
measure social anxiety as validly as the full version of the BFNE. Items were rated using a 5-
point scale (1= Not at all characteristic of me; 5 = Extremely characteristic of me). A sample 
item is “I am afraid that people will find fault with me.”  
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Worry. Worry was measured using the eight-item (α = .97) Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire - Abbreviated (PSWQ-A; Hopko et al., 2003), which has been found to have good 
reliability and construct validity in both older adults and younger adults (Crittendon & Hopko, 
2006). Participants rated each item on a five-point scale (1 = Not at all typical of me; 5 = Very 
typical of me). A sample item is “My worries overwhelm me.”  
Panic. Panic was measured using the eight-item (α = .88) panic subscale from the 
Inventory of Depression and Anxiety Symptoms (IDAS; Watson et al., 2007). The IDAS has 
demonstrated strong reliability, construct validity as well as substantial criterion validity in 
relation to DSM-IV anxiety disorder diagnoses (Watson et al., 2008). Participants rated each item 
on a five-point scale (1 = Not at all; 5 = Extremely). A sample item is “My heart was racing or 
pounding.”  
Statistical Analyses 
 Three structural equation models were constructed. Model 3 (Fig. 3, Empathy)  examined 
the relationships between the general factor and the specific shame and guilt factors and 
empathy. As can be seen in Figure 3, the shame and guilt part of the model was constructed 
following the basic format of Model 1 from Study 1, that is, the bi-factor model with one general 
factor and two specific factors. Model 4 (Fig. 4, Big Five Personality) examined the relationships 
between the general factor and the specific shame and guilt factors and the big five personality 
traits.  As can be seen in Figure 4, each of big five personality factors was set to correlate with 
the others. We chose to do so because substantial relationships among the big five personality 
factors have been proposed theoretically (Rushton & Irwing, 2011) and found empirically 
(Digman, 1997).  Model 5 (Fig. 5, Psychopathology) examined the relationships between the 
general factor and the specific shame and guilt factors and higher order psychopathology factors. 
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As can be seen in Figure 5, following Krueger & Markon (2006), the second-order factor of 
internalizing psychopathology was indexed by the first-order factors of depression, worry, social 
phobia and panic disorder. Likewise, following Krueger et al. (2007), the second order factor of 
externalizing psychopathology was indexed by the first-order factor of general disinhibition, 
callous aggression and substance abuse. It should be noted that for each of these models, the 
general factor and specific shame and guilt factors were set to predict outcomes simultaneously. 
Thus, the specific factors were taken into account when examining the general factors, and vice 
versa. We constructed the same three models using both the GASP and the TOSCA-3 to see 
whether the results would replicate across instruments. The analyses were conducted using R 
with the lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012).  
We used parcels as indicators for outcome variables, given that parcels have been shown 
to produce more reliable latent variables than individual items (Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & 
Widaman, 2002). Specifically, we conducted factor analyses and aggregated items with higher 
and lower loadings to form three parcels for each of the outcome variables. We employed the 
comparative fit index (CFI) and the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) to assess 
model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). We chose not to rely on the chi-square test because it has been 
demonstrated to be problematic when the datasets are large (e.g., Hoyle, 1995). Conventional 
guidelines for cutoff values suggest that RMSEA lower than .05 as a good fit, values lower 
than .08 as a reasonable fit and values between .08 and .10 as a mediocre fit (Cudeck & Browne, 
1992). CFI values greater than .90 have often been considered an indicator of acceptable model 
fit (Marsh, Hau, & Grayson, 2005). Given the complexity of the relationships studied in the 
current study, we chose not to focus on maximizing absolute fit of the models. Rather we 




Descriptive Statistics. The correlations of manifest variables included in the analyses of 
Study 2 are displayed in Table 2 in the supplementary materials.  
Personality. Table 3 displays the model fit indices as well as the standardized regression 
coefficients for Model 3 (Empathy) and Model 4 (Big Five Personality). As in Study 1, fit 
indices suggested that the models fit was excellent when the GASP was used (CFI = .93 and CFI 
= .90 respectively, RMSEA = .05 and RMSEA = .06). For the TOSCA-3, the model fit was 
mediocre for CFI (CFI = .81 and CFI = .83 respectively) but good for RMSEA (RMSEA = .07 
and RMSEA = .06 respectively). 
Consistent with our hypothesis that the general factor would be positively associated with 
empathy (Hypothesis 1a), for both the GASP and the TOSCA-3, the general factor strongly and 
positively predicted empathy,  = .58 and  = .60 respectively, ps < .001. For big five 
personality factors, a consistent pattern of results emerged as well across the GASP and the 
TOSCA-3, in that the general factor significantly and positively predicted agreeableness ( = .43 
and  = .45 respectively, ps < .001) and conscientiousness ( = .36 and  = .28 respectively, ps 
< .001), providing support for Hypothesis 1b. However, contrary to Hypothesis 2c, the general 
factor did not significantly predict either extraversion or neuroticism.   
The shame factor predicted all big five traits in a manner suggesting it is negatively 
associated with social effectiveness (Rushton & Irwing, 2011). Specifically, the shame factor 
significantly but negatively predicted extraversion ( = -.22 and  = -.42 respectively, ps 
< .001), agreeableness ( = -.13 and  = -.30 respectively, p = .04 & < .001), conscientiousness 
( = -.32 and  = -.36 respectively, ps < .001), openness ( = -.18 and  = -.23 respectively, p 
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= .01 & < .001), whereas it significantly positively predicted neuroticism ( = .39 and  = .57 
respectively, ps < .001). There was a weak negative association between shame and empathy for 
the TOSCA-3 ( = -.11, p = .03), but not for the GASP. For the guilt factor, across the GASP 
and the TOSCA-3, no consistently strong prediction was observed for any of the big five factors, 
when the general factor was taken into account.  
Psychopathology. Table 3 displays the model fit indices as well as the standardized 
regression coefficients for Model 5 (Psychopathology). Supporting Hypothesis 1c, the general 
factor strongly and negatively predicted externalizing psychopathology ( = -.63 and  = -.45 
respectively, ps < .001). Contrary to Hypothesis 2d, the general factor did not predict 
internalizing psychopathology. Across both the GASP and the TOSCA-3, the specific shame 
factor strongly and positively predicted both externalizing psychopathology ( = .13 and  = .30 
respectively, ps = .05 & <.001), and internalizing psychopathology ( = .47 and  = .69 
respectively, ps < .001). Guilt did not predict externalizing psychopathology or internalizing 
psychopathology, for either the GASP or the TOSCA-3. 
Discussion 
We examined the relationships between shame and guilt and a variety of important 
personality variables and psychopathology outcomes, using two most widely accepted scales of 
shame and guilt (i.e., the GASP and the TOSCA-3). The pattern of results was exceptionally 
consistent across the two scales. We found strong and consistent evidence supporting Hypothesis 
1 that the general factor shared reflects the moral emotion process underlying shame and guilt, 
and serves as a protective factor for externalizing psychopathology. To our surprise, we failed to 
find any evidence supporting Hypothesis 2, which proposes the general factor represents the self-
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conscious emotion process underlying shame and guilt, and confers risk for internalizing 
psychopathology. However, it should be noted that none of the instruments in Study 2 directly 
reflect self-conscious emotional processes. We addressed this limitation in Study 3.  
In addition to the predictive utility of the general factor, the specific shame factor also 
positively predicted neuroticism, negatively predicted openness, conscientiousness, extraversion 
and agreeableness, and strongly and positively predicted internalizing psychopathology. By 
contrast, no consistent and/or strong effects were found for the specific guilt factor with any of 
the outcome variables examined in Study 2. 
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CHAPTER 4: STUDY 3 AND EXAMINING THE SELF-CONSCIOUS EMOTION 
HYPOTHESIS 
Study 3 had three goals. First, we tested whether the findings of Study 2 regarding 
psychopathology would replicate in a different sample when employing multiple measurement 
methods. Importantly, we measured psychopathology not only using self-report, but also using 
informants’ ratings of participants’ psychopathology. The second goal was to further test the 
self-conscious emotion hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) by examining variables that are more directly 
linked to the negative self-conscious emotion process, namely, self-consciousness (Hypothesis 
2a), and self-criticism and vulnerable narcissism (Hypothesis 2b).  
Participants 
A total of 474 undergraduate students from a large Midwestern university completed the 
study in exchange for course credit. To ensure data quality, we included 8 attention checks to 
ensure that participants were paying attention to questionnaires. A total of 28 (5.9%) participants 
were excluded from the analyses because they failed on at least one of the attention check 
questions. Thus, analyses were conducted on a sample of 446 participants between the ages of 18 
and 24 years (M = 19.2, SD = 1.3; 61% female; 45.7% European American, 8.4 % African 
American, and 34.6% Asian/Asian American, 4.1% multiracial, and 7.3% other). 
Informants  
Each participant was asked to identify and invite four close others to provide confidential 
and independent reports on the participants’ symptoms indicative of externalizing and 
internalizing psychopathology. These close others could be family, friends, or romantic partners 
who are “the most important people in your life.” They must have been at least 18 years old, 
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have known the participant for at least six months, and have internet access in order to be 
eligible. Specifically, participants emailed their close others a brief description of our study and a 
link to an online survey. A total of 559 close others completed the surveys, providing data for 
226 participants (50.7% of the entire sample).  
Measures 
Guilt and shame proneness. As with Study 1 and 2, guilt and shame proneness were 
measured using the GASP  and the TOSCA-3 .  
Depression. As with Study 2, depression was measured with 7 items (α = .88) from the 
Anhedonic Depression subscale from Mood and Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire (MASQ-AD; 
Watson et al., 1995).  
Worry. As with Study 2, worry was measured using the eight-item (α = .95) Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire - Abbreviated (PSWQ-A; Hopko et al., 2003).  
Social Anxiety. As with Study 2, social anxiety was measured with the abridged 8-item 
version (α = .93) of the Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (BFNE-S; Weeks et al., 2005).   
Meanness. Meanness was measured using the 19-item (α = .87) Meanness subscale from 
the Triarchic Psychopathy Measure (TriPM Meanness; Patrick, 2010). The scale has 
demonstrated good reliability and construct validity in terms of both normal-range and 
dysfunctional personality traits (Stanley, Wygant, & Sellbom, 2013). Items were rated using a 4-
point scale (1= “true;” 4 = “false”). A sample item is “I taunt people just to stir things up.” 
Self-criticism. Self-criticism was measured using the 6-item (α = .76) version self-
criticism subscale from the Depression Experience Questionnaire (DEQ-SC6; Rudich et al., 
2008), which has been shown to have reliability and construct validity as high as the full self-
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criticism subscale (Rudich et al., 2008). The DEQ-SC6 measures the trait of self-criticism (i.e., 
setting high standards for oneself and self-punitive responding to failures), without referring to 
depressed mood. Participants rated each item on a seven-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 
=strongly agree). A sample item is “I have a tendency to be very self-critical.” 
Self-consciousness. Self-consciousness was measured using the private and public self-
consciousness subscales from the Self-consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). 
The scale was designed to assess individual differences in self-consciousness, and has three 
components: public, private, and social anxiety. We did not include the social anxiety subscale to 
avoid content overlap with the items in one of our outcome measures (i.e., social anxiety). The 
scale has been found to have good reliability and construct validity (Fenigstein et al., 1975). The 
private (10 items, α = .68) and public (7 items, α = .76) self-consciousness scales were used in 
the current study. Participants rated each item on a 5-point scale (0 = Extremely 
Uncharacteristic, 4 = Extremely Characteristic). A sample item is “I’m constantly examining 
my motives” (private), and “I’m concerned about what other people think of me” (public).  
Vulnerable Narcissism. Vulnerable Narcissism was measured with the 10-item (α = .72) 
Hypersensitivity Narcissism Scale (HSNS; Hendin & Cheek, 1997). It has been found to have 
good psychometric properties and reasonable evidence of convergent and discriminant validity 
(Hendin & Cheek, 1997). Items were rated using a 5-point scale (1= very uncharacteristic of me; 
5 = very characteristic of me). A sample item is “I often interpret the remarks of others in a 
personal way.”  
Dysphoria, Informant-report. The informant report of internalizing psychopathology 
was measured using the 10-item Dysphoria subscale of the Inventory of Depression and Anxiety 
Symptoms (IDAS; Watson, O’Hara, Simms, & Kotov, 2007). We revised the instructions, asking 
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informants to determine “how well each item describes your friend/family member’s recent 
feelings and experiences during the past two weeks.” We also revised the wording of the items 
so that each item was written in third-person perspective (e.g., “blamed himself/herself for 
things” rather than “blamed myself for things”). Items were rated using a 5-point scale (1 = not at 
all, 5 = extremely). The internal consistency was α =.89.  
Meanness, Informant-report. The informant report of externalizing psychopathology 
was measured using the 19-item (α = .90) Meanness subscale from the Triarchic Psychopathy 
Measure (TriPM Meanness; Patrick, 2010). Again, to reflect the third-person perspective, we 
revised the instructions (“choose the option that describes your friend/family member best”) and 
wording of the items (e.g., “How other people feel is important to him/her” rather than “how 
other people is important to me”). Items were rated using a 4-point scale (1= “true;” 4 = “false”).  
Statistical Analyses 
Three structural equation models were constructed to examine the relationships between 
the general factor and the specific factors of shame and guilt and self-related variables (Model 6), 
as well as externalizing and internalizing psychopathology (Model 7 for self-reported measures 
and Model 8 for informant-reported measures). The basic formats of these models are similar to 
those we constructed in Study 2, with specific indicators being slightly different, as detailed 
below.  
The basic format of Model 6 (Self) is similar to that of Model 4 (Big Fiver Personality) in 
Figure 4, except that we replaced the big five personality traits with self-related variables (Model 
6). We examined all self-related variables in the same model setting them to be correlated with 
one another, because (a) we considered these variables as various aspects of the self-conscious 
emotion process that are closely tied to each other; (b) we found substantial associations among 
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any two of these four variables (r ranges from .23 to .50). The basic formats of Model 7 
(Psychopathology-Self-Reported) and Model 8 (Psychopathology-Informant-Reported) are 
similar to that of Model 5 (Psychopathology) in Figure 5. In Model 7 (Psychopathology-Self-
Reported), internalizing psychopathology was indexed by the first-order factors of depression, 
worry and social anxiety; and externalizing psychopathology was indexed by the first order 
factor of meanness, one sub-factor of psychopathy (Patrick, 2010). Model 8 (Psychopathology-
Informant-Reported) indexed externalizing and internalizing psychopathology with informant-
reported measures. We included only one measure to index each construct as we need to 
minimize the time it takes for each informant to complete the survey to ensure data quality.  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics. The correlation of manifest variables included in the analyses of 
Study 3 are displayed in Table 4 in the supplementary materials.  
Personality. Table 4 displays the model fit indices as well as the standardized regression 
coefficients for Model 6 (Self). As in Study 1 and 2, fit indices suggested that the models fit was 
excellent when the GASP was used (CFI = .91 and CFI = .93 respectively, RMSEA = .04 and 
RMSEA = .04). For the TOSCA-3, the model fit was mediocre for CFI (CFI = .79 and CFI = .79 
respectively) but good for RMSEA (RMSEA = .05 and RMSEA = .06 respectively).  
Supporting Hypothesis 2a, the general factor was positively correlated with both public 
self-consciousness ( = .17 and  = .11 respectively, ps = .00 and .09) and private self-
consciousness ( = .22 and  = .18 respectively, ps = .00 and .01). However, contrary to 




A strong and consistent pattern emerged between the specific shame factor and self-
related variables, but not for the guilt factor. Particularly, across the GASP and the TOSCA-3, 
the specific shame factor significantly and positively predicted most of the self-related variables, 
including public self-consciousness ( = .34 and  = .56 respectively, ps < .001), self-criticism 
( = .19 and  = .55 respectively, ps = .01 and < .001), and vulnerable narcissism ( = .41 and  
= .28 respectively, ps < .001). There was a significant positive link between the shame factor 
and private self-consciousness for the TOSCA-3 ( = .21, p < .001), but not for the GASP. It 
should be noted that the effect sizes between shame and self-related variables tend to be a lot 
higher for the TOSCA-3 than the GASP. For the guilt factor, the findings are less consistent and 
even contradictory across the two instruments. Specifically, the guilt factor negatively predicted 
private self-consciousness ( = -.19, p = .03), but the link was positive for the GASP ( = .24, p 
=.00). The guilt factor negatively predicted vulnerable narcissism for the TOSCA-3 ( = -.19, p 
= .03), but the link was not significantly for the GASP.  
Externalizing and Internalizing and Psychopathology: Self-Report. Table 4 displays the 
model fit indices and standardized regression coefficients for Model 7 (Psychopathology-Self-
Reported). Again, the models fit was excellent when the GASP was used (CFI = .96, RMSEA 
= .04). For the TOSCA-3, the model fit was mediocre for CFI (CFI = .87) but good for RMSEA 
(RMSEA = .05).  
As with Study 2, across the GASP or the TOSCA-3, the general factor of shame and guilt 
strongly and negatively predicted externalizing psychopathology, ( = -.65 and  = -.52, ps 
<.001), providing strong support for Hypothesis 1c. Unlike what we found in Study 2, the 
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general factor also positively predicted internalizing psychopathology, ( = .20 and  = .20, ps 
< .001 & = .01), supporting Hypothesis 2d. 
Unlike what we found in Study 2, shame did not predict externalizing psychopathology in 
this sample and this is consistent across the GASP and the TOSCA-3. However, as with Study 2, 
the specific shame factor strongly and positively predicted internalizing psychopathology,   
= .38, p <.001 for the GASP, and this effect was even stronger for the TOSCA-3,  = .77, p 
<.001. As in Study 2, the specific guilt factor did not predict internalizing psychopathology or 
externalizing psychopathology for the GASP. The TOSCA-3 guilt factor did not predict 
internalizing psychopathology, but predicted externalizing psychopathology,  = -.36, p < .001.   
Externalizing and Internalizing Psychopathology: Informant-Report. Table 4 displays the 
model fit indices and the standardized regression coefficients for Model 8 (Psychopathology-
Informant-Reported). Again, the models fit was excellent when the GASP was used (CFI = .92, 
RMSEA = .05). For the TOSCA-3, the model fit was mediocre for CFI (CFI = .82) but good for 
RMSEA (RMSEA = .06).  
Consistent with what we obtained with the self-reported findings, we found the general 
factor negatively predicted externalizing psychopathology for both the GASP and the TOSCA-3, 
 = -.28 & -.29, ps <.001, providing further support for Hypothesis 1c. Furthermore, consistent 
with the self-report data, the specific shame factor was positively associated with internalizing 
psychopathology for both the GASP and the TOSCA-3,  = .16 and  = .21 respectively, ps 
= .08 &.01. Unlike self-report results, the general factor did not significantly predict 
internalizing psychopathology. And again, the specific factor of guilt was not predictive for 




In Study 3, we examined the relationships between shame and guilt and self-related 
variables and psychopathology outcomes, using both self-reported measures as well as 
informant-reported measures of psychopathology. As with Study 2, we found findings consistent 
across two scales that lend strong support to Hypothesis 1, that is, the general factor shared by 
shame and guilt serves as a protective factor for externalizing psychopathology. Particularly, we 
found the general factor strongly and inversely predicted externalizing psychopathology 
(Hypothesis 1c) regardless whether we used self-reported or informant-reported measure to 
assess psychopathology. Again, we found mixed evidence regarding Hypothesis 2. In particular, 
we found, across two scales, the general factor positively predicted self-consciousness, 
supporting Hypothesis 2a; did not predict self-criticism or vulnerable narcissism, failing to 
support Hypothesis 2b; and importantly, positively predicted internalizing psychopathology, 
supporting Hypothesis 2d.  
As with Study 2, we continued to find the specific shame factor confer substantial risk 
information for internalizing psychopathology, using both self-reported and informant-reported 
measures of psychopathology; and in Study 3, we found it was closely tied to the self-conscious 
emotion process. Particularly, we found the shame factor positively predicted all of the self-
related variables (i.e., self-consciousness, self-criticism, and vulnerable narcissism), and 
positively predicted internalizing psychopathology. As with Study 2, the findings for the specific 
guilt factor were less consistent compared to the other two factors and were even contradictory 
across the two instruments for some of the outcomes (e.g., private self-consciousness). 
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CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the general factor shared by shame 
and guilt, using a bi-factor model approach. That the general factor has been overlooked in the 
previous literature reflects an overemphasis on distinguishing shame and guilt from one another 
and an overreliance on partial correlations. Across the two most well-validated and commonly 
used scales of shame- and guilt-proneness (the GASP and the TOSCA-3), multiple large 
independent samples, and both self-reported and informant-reported measures of 
psychopathology, the current research yielded three main findings. First, we found strong and 
consistent evidence supporting Hypothesis 1 that the general factor shared by shame and guilt 
captures characteristics of moral emotions, and that it serves as a protective factor for 
externalizing psychopathology. Second, while the part of shame shared with guilt is strongly 
related to moral emotion and buffers against externalizing psychopathology, the variance specific 
to shame was highly related to self-criticism, vulnerable narcissism and neuroticism, and confers 
significant risk for internalizing psychopathology. Third, contrary to Hypothesis 2, we found 
mixed evidence regarding Hypothesis 2. While we did find a positive relationship between the 
general factor and both public and private forms of self-consciousness, we did not find any 
significant associations between the general factor and self-criticism or vulnerable narcissism. 
Neither did we find a significant relationship between the general factor and neuroticism.  
The Meaning of the General Factor 
Supporting Hypothesis 1, the general factor was strongly and positively associated with 
traits relevant to morality, such as empathy, agreeableness and conscientiousness. Previous 
research has suggested that guilt is related to similar traits (e..g, Fayard, Roberts, Robins, & 
Watson, 2012). However, our findings suggest that such traits are not associated specifically with 
guilt, but rather are associated with the general factor shared by shame and guilt. Taken together, 
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our findings suggest that that which is shared by shame and guilt represents a very adaptive 
response- a tendency to be concerned with how others feel, to conform to rules and standards, 
and to be adjusting one’s behaviors accordingly. It is a response that motivates behaviors that 
meet important social goals (e.g., getting along and maintaining social status).  
Not surprisingly, we found the general factor was inversely associated with externalizing 
psychopathology, using both self and informant reports of psychopathology. This is consistent 
with past research that found guilt to be inversely associated with specific forms of externalizing 
psychopathology, such as aggression (Tangney et al., 1996), antisocial personality (Tangney, 
Stuewig, Mashek, & Hastings, 2011), and criminal re-offense (Tangney, Stuewig, & Martinez, 
2014). Our study is the first that examined the relationship between shame, guilt and higher order 
factors of psychopathology.  
The Value of the Bi-Factor Model 
  We used a bi-factor model primarily because it enabled us to directly examine the 
variance shared by shame and guilt. We believe the results of our research provide evidence of 
the utility of this approach.  For example, the strength of the association between the general 
factor and externalizing psychopathology was a fair bit larger than that typically reported in past 
research. Whereas in the present research the strength of the association between the general 
factor and externalizing psychopathology ranged from -.45 to -.65, in past research, the 
association between guilt and externalizing psychopathology has mostly fallen into the range 
of .2 to .3 (e.g., Tangney, Stuewig, & Martinez, 2014).  
 We believe the use of a bi-factor model also helped clarify the relations between 
dispositional shame and guilt and the Big Five personality traits.  For example, whereas Cohen et 
al. (2011) found that, across two studies, the correlations between agreeableness and the four 
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facets of shame and guilt ranged from -.19 to .33 (with a mean of .132), we found a strong 
association between agreeableness and the general factor (.43 using the GASP, and .45 using the 
TOSCA). 
The Double-Sided Shame 
Our findings suggest that shame has two very distinct sides. On the one hand, we found 
the specific shame factor was positively associated with self-criticism, vulnerable narcissism and 
neuroticism, negatively associated with extraversion, conscientiousness, agreeableness and 
openness, and, positively associated with internalizing psychopathology. These findings go 
beyond previous research that found a relationship between shame and specific mental disorders, 
such as MDD (Andrews, Qian, & Valentine, 2002), PTSD (Leskela, Dieperink, & Thuras, 2002) 
and SAD (Gilbert, 2000), by demonstrating a link between shame and both social ineffectiveness 
and the liability to internalizing psychopathology more broadly. On the other hand, as noted 
above, we also found the part of shame that is shared with guilt is associated with a variety of 
outcomes linked with morality and serves as a protective factor against externalizing 
psychopathology. Thus, on the one hand, the part specific to shame represents a much darker 
response that should be discouraged and prevented if possible, whereas on the other hand, the 
part of shame that is shared with guilt represents a very adaptive response. These two sets of 
findings shed light on an important inconsistency between the theorizing of shame as a moral 
emotion and the vast majority of findings that failed to support this view. The reason why some 
previous research has failed to find evidence of shame being a moral emotion is that they 
routinely removed covariance between shame and guilt through partial correlations. For 
                                                          
2 Even if withdrawal were not included, the mean correlation, across the two studies, between agreeableness and 
the remaining facets of shame and guilt was far smaller (.23) than the association we found between 
agreeableness and the general factor.  
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example, shame was found to be negatively associated with empathic responsiveness (Tangney, 
1991), but this finding was based on partial correlations removing covariance between shame 
and guilt. Indeed, our findings suggest this practice might be misleading because it is the aspect 
that is common to shame and guilt that is strongly positively associated with empathic concern 
but negatively associated with externalizing psychopathology.  
It is worth noting that in the present research, the factor loadings of the withdrawal items 
tended to be relatively low on the general factor but high on the specific shame factor. 
Researchers have been debating the role of withdrawal in shame (Cohen et al., 2011). This 
pattern suggests that withdrawal and self-deprecation may represent different constructs that 
should be considered separately. Thus, taken together, the results of the present research point 
out the need for further exploration of the role of withdrawal in shame, and suggest that future 
work focusing on the measurement of withdrawal in the context of shame is needed. 
The Importance of Distinguishing between Self-Consciousness vs. Self-Criticism 
We found mixed evidence for Hypothesis 2, the self-conscious emotion hypothesis. 
Specifically, we found the general factor was positively associated with self-consciousness, but 
was not associated with self-criticism, vulnerable narcissism, neuroticism or extraversion. In 
fact, we were surprised that neither the general factor nor the guilt factor were significantly 
positively associated with the self-related variables (i.e., self-criticism, self-consciousness, self-
absorption). Theoretically, self-awareness, self-representation and self-evaluation are all 
considered to be prerequisite processes for both shame and guilt (Tracy & Robins, 2004). 
However, our findings did not support this point of view. One possible way to interpret these 
results is that guilt represents the ability or proneness to respond to transgressions, mistakes, and 
interpersonal frictions, without evaluating oneself, even in terms of the specific behaviors they 
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exhibited. It is possible that the emotional experience of guilt, in which one recognizes a 
wrongdoing and attempts to right one’s wrong, has been highly differentiated from one’s self-
evaluative process. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
The present results are tempered by several limitations. First, similar to prior studies, the 
current research is cross-sectional in nature. It will be especially valuable to conduct longitudinal 
research among children and adolescents to explore how and when shame, guilt, and that which 
they share, emerge, and whether there are unique developmental pathways for each of them. 
Second, it is important to keep in mind that our measures of shame and guilt are based on the self 
vs. behavior distinction of shame and guilt. Although the self vs. behavior approach is the most 
accepted approach in the field, upon which the majority of empirical literature of shame and guilt 
is built, some theorists have suggested that other appraisals and action tendencies are also central 
to shame and guilt. Examples include the discrepancy between actual self and ideal self (Higgins, 
1987) and empathic concern for others’ suffering (Hoffman, 1987). Future research should 
examine the structure of shame and guilt, and their relationship with important correlates (e.g., 
personality, psychopathology), when conceptualizing and measuring shame and guilt more 
broadly. An additional limitation concerns the generalizability of results with participants from 
the United States to other cultures. Cross-cultural research suggests that Asians might experience 
shame and guilt differently than westerners (e.g., Benedict, 1946; Wong & Tsai, 2007; Sznycer 
et al., 2012).  Similarly, the associations between shame, guilt and psychopathology may differ 
between Asians and westerners (Zhong et al., 2008). However, it is unclear to what degree 
cultural influences might affect the structure of shame and guilt or their relations with 
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psychopathology. Thus, it will be important for future research to test whether the findings of the 
current research can be generalized to other diverse samples.  
The current research examined a variety of personality and psychopathology outcomes. It 
would be valuable for future research to examine a broader array of potential correlates of guilt 
and shame. In particular, we believe it will be useful to explore positive outcomes (e.g., 
subjective well-being, positive emotions), as well as outcomes in important life domains (e.g., 
physical health, job and/or relationship satisfaction). For example, it is possible that whereas the 
guilt-specific factor was not associated with psychopathology, it may be associated with positive 
outcomes.  
Conclusions 
 Despite the limitations of the present research, our findings shed light on some critical 
inconsistencies in the literature, thereby clarifying the nature and significance of negative self-
conscious emotions, such as shame and guilt. Our findings clearly demonstrate the value of 
attending to the general factor shared by shame and guilt and distinguishing it from the variance 
specific to shame and guilt. We believe this approach will be critical to the study of shame and 






Study 1: Model Fit Statistics for Bi-factor Models with Two Scales of Shame and Guilt 
  M22 df RMSEA CFI 
GASP         
   Model 1, General+Shame+Guilt 19.69 8 0.02 1 
   Model 2, General+NSE/NBE/Repair/Withdrawal 26.14 8 0.02 0.98 
TOSCA     
   Model 1, General+ Shame+Guilt 1129.21 334 0.05 0.82 
   Model 2, General+ NSE/NBE/Repair/Withdrawal 1247.35 334 0.06 0.79 
Note. GASP = Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale; TOSCA = Test of Self-conscious Affect -
3; General = General bi-factor; Shame  =  Shame bi-factor;  Guilt = Guilt bi-factor NSE =  




Study 1: Factor Loadings for Bi-factor Models with Two Scales of Shame and Guilt 
 Model 1  Model 2 












GASP3 0.71  0.24    0.64  0.38     
GASP6 0.53  0.27    0.41  0.60     
GASP10 0.72  0.21    0.66  0.29     
GASP13 0.62  0.15    0.56  0.32     
GASP4 -0.25  0.73    -0.19   0.72    
GASP7 -0.14  0.55    -0.09   0.56    
GASP8 -0.21  0.57    -0.16   0.59    
GASP12 -0.01  0.59    0.06   0.61    
GASP1 0.55   0.24   0.62    0.33   
GASP9 0.75   0.20   0.79    0.17   
GASP14 0.74   0.17   0.77    -0.01   
GASP16 0.65   0.36   0.75    0.22   
GASP2 0.54   0.32   0.58     0.29  
GASP5 0.54   0.49   0.64     0.26  
GASP11 0.55   0.45   0.60     0.49  
GASP15 0.56    0.43   0.61        0.40  
Model fit 
M2 c2=19.69, df=8, 
RMSEA=.02, CFI=1.00 
 
M2 c2=26.14, df=8, RMSEA=.02, CFI=.98 
 
Model 1  Model 2 












TOSCA          
TOSCA1S 0.26  0.30    0.30  0.33     
TOSCA4S 0.31  0.55    0.36  0.56     
TOSCA6S 0.34  0.33    0.29  0.32     
TOSCA7S 0.15  0.52    0.17  0.53     
TOSCA8S 0.11  0.47    0.11  0.50     
TOSCA9S 0.27  0.45    0.34  0.41     
TOSCA10S 0.15  0.60    0.22  0.59     
TOSCA12S 0.52  0.27    0.51  0.19     
TOSCA14S 0.24  0.56    0.33  0.50     
TOSCA15S 0.15  0.64    0.25  0.63     
TOSCA2W 0.03  0.39    0.05   0.37    
TOSCA3W 0.19  0.35    0.26   0.32    
TOSCA5W -0.58  0.44    -0.39   0.51    
TOSCA11W 0.29  0.31    0.31   0.27    
40 
 
Table 2 cont.          
TOSCA13W 0.24  0.61    0.40   0.63    
TOSCA16W 0.02  0.53    0.16   0.61    
TOSCA3B 0.38   0.18   0.43    0.08   
TOSCA4B 0.33   0.11   0.36    0.07   
TOSCA6B 0.32   -0.09   0.28    -0.33   
TOSCA9B 0.35   0.31   0.47    0.14   
TOSCA10B 0.30   0.34   0.43    0.09   
TOSCA11B 0.45   -0.01   0.43    -0.32   
TOSCA13B 0.38   0.47   0.53    0.30   
TOSCA14B 0.38   0.37   0.52    0.17   
TOSCA1R 0.32   0.52   0.43     0.51  
TOSCA2R 0.46   0.22   0.53     0.06  
TOSCA5R 0.68   0.09   0.57     0.05  
TOSCA7R 0.36   0.66   0.54     0.56  
TOSCA8R 0.27   0.55   0.40     0.49  
TOSCA12R 0.57   0.10   0.56     -0.04  
TOSCA15R 0.28   0.64   0.48     0.41  





 M2 c2=1247.35, df=334, RMSEA=.06, 
CFI=.79   
Note. Note. GASP = Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale; TOSCA = Test of Self-conscious Affect -3; 
General = General bi-factor; Shame =  Shame bi-factor;  Guilt = Guilt bi-factor NSE =  Negative self-




Study 2. Estimated Factor Correlations Between GASP & TOSCA Bi-factor Model Factors and Psychopathology and Personality Factors 
GASP 
Outcomes 
Standardized regression coefficients 
Model Fit 
General Shame Guilt 
Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p  df CFI RMSEA 
Model 3: Empathy 
  Empathy 0.58  <.001 -0.01  0.83  0.05  0.64  297.28 133 0.93 0.05 
Model 4: Big Five Personality 
  Extraversion -0.01  0.90  -0.22  0.00  -0.11  0.17  
940.68 393 0.9 0.06 
  Agreeableness 0.43  <.001 -0.13  0.04  -0.15  0.13  
  Conscientiousness 0.36  <.001 -0.32  <.001 -0.16  0.07  
  Neuroticism -0.03  0.57  0.39  <.001 0.07  0.32  
  Openness 0.18  0.00  -0.18  0.01  0.12  0.18  
Model 5: Psychopathology 
  Internalizing -0.09  0.14  0.47  <.001 0.05  0.53  
1277.71 599 0.94 0.05 
  Externalizing  -0.63  <.001 0.13  0.05  0.12  0.15  
TOSCA  
Outcomes Standardized regression coefficients 
Model Fit 
 General Shame Guilt 
  Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p  df CFI RMSEA 
Model 3: Empathy 
  Empathy 0.64  <.001 -0.11  0.03  0.00  0.96  1528.17 525 0.81 0.07 
Model 4: Big Five Personality 
  Extraversion 0.08  0.12  -0.42  <.001 -0.13  0.03  
2415.73 977 0.83 0.06 
  Agreeableness 0.45  <.001 -0.30  <.001 -0.10  0.14  
  Conscientiousness 0.28  <.001 -0.36  <.001 0.11  0.09  
  Neuroticism -0.05  0.34  0.57  <.001 0.15  0.01  
  Openness 0.22  <.001 -0.23  <.001 0.17  0.01  
Model 5: Psychopathology 
  Internalizing -0.07  0.26  0.69  <.001 0.11  0.07  
2932.6 1279 0.88 0.05 
  Externalizing  -0.45  <.001 0.30  <.001 -0.09  0.19  
Note. GASP = Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale; TOSCA = Test of Self-conscious Affect -3; General = General factor; Shame =  Specific 




Study 3. Estimated Factor Correlations Between GASP & TOSCA Bi-factor Model Factors and Psychopathology and Personality Factors 
GASP 
Outcomes 
Standardized regression coefficients 
Model Fit 
General Shame Guilt 
Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p  df CFI RMSEA 
Model 6: Self-Related Variables 
  Self-criticism 0.02 0.78 0.19 0.01 -0.03 0.74 
583.18 316 0.91 0.04 
  PubScon 0.17 0.00 0.34 <.001 -0.03 0.67 
  PriScon 0.22 0.00 0.05 0.47 -0.19 0.03 
  VNar -0.07 0.28 0.41 <.001 -0.15 0.08 
Model 7: Self-Reported Psychopathology 
  Internalizing-Self 0.20 <.001 0.38 <.001 -0.06 0.47 
573.55 324 0.96 0.04 
  Externalizing-Self -0.65 <.001 -0.04 0.54 0.00 0.99 
Model 8: Informant-Reported Psychopatholgoy 
  Internalizing-Informant 0.00 0.97 0.16 0.08 -0.09 0.35 
281.60 186 0.92 0.05 
  Externalizing-Informant -0.28 <.001 0.18 0.05 -0.03 0.76 
TOSCA 
Outcomes 
Standardized regression coefficients 
Model Fit 
General Shame Guilt 
Estimate p Estimate p Estimate p  df CFI RMSEA 
Model 6: Self-Related variables 
  Self-criticism 0.00 1.00 0.55 <.001 -0.06 0.36 
1919.79 852 0.79 0.05 
  PubScon 0.11 0.09 0.56 <.001 0.10 0.09 
  PriScon 0.18 0.01 0.21 <.001 0.24 0.00 
  VNar -0.01 0.86 0.55 <.001 -0.21 0.00 
Model 7: Self-Reported Psychopathology 
  Internalizing-Self 0.20 0.01 0.77 <.001 -0.02 0.70 
1867 860 0.87 0.05 
  Externalizing-Self -0.52 <.001 -0.06 0.26 -0.36 <.001 
Model 8: Informant-Reported Psychopatholgoy 
  Internalizing-Informant 0.04 0.61 0.21 0.01 0.15 0.07 
1101.11 626 0.82 0.06 
  Externalizing-Informant -0.29 0.00 0.05 0.55 -0.02 0.82 
Note. GASP = Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale; TOSCA = Test of Self-conscious Affect -3; General = General factor; Shame =  Specific shame 
factor;  Guilt = Specific guilt factor. PubScon = Public self-consciousness; PriScon = Private self-consciousness; VNar = Vulnerable narcissism; 






 Shame  Guilt  
General Factor 
Figure 1. Basic format of Model 1: A single general bi-factor with four specific bi-factors.    
Note. In the actual models used, the number of indicator variables varied depending on the latent variable 


















 NSE  Withdrawal  NBE  Repair 
General Factor  
Figure 2. Basic format of Model 2: A single general bi-factor with four specific bi-factors. 






Figure 3. Basic format of Model 3, a structural equation model testing relationship between shame, guilt and empathy.  






Figure 4. Basic format of Model 4, a structural equation model testing relationship between shame, guilt and big five personality traits.  
Note. In the actual models used, the number of indicator variables varied depending on the latent factor in question. 
O = Openness; C = Conscientiousness; E = Extraversion; A = Agreeableness; N = Neuroticism; General = General factor; Shame = 




Figure 5. Basic format of Model 5, a structural equation model testing relationship between shame, guilt and higher order psychopathology.  
Note. In the actual models used, the number of indicator variables varied depending on the latent factor in question. 
Dep = Depression; SA = Social Anxiety; ESI -GD = Externalizing Spectrum Inventory, General Disinhibition; ESI – CA = Externalizing 
Spectrum Inventory, Callous Aggression;  ESI – SA = Externalizing Spectrum Inventory, Substance Abuse;  
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